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Over the past several decades, the secondary market system has evolved into a more 
complex and fragmented system than it once was. The Investor’s Exchange (IEX) emerged 
in 2014 in rebellion of purportedly unethical High-Frequency Trading (HFT) behaviors in 
the markets. Using a novel, proprietary model for trade matching along with providing 
other services, the IEX has become a respectable player in the market system that prides 
itself on transparency and fairness. This paper explores the role that IEX has played in 
market fragmentation since its inception using empirical and historical analysis. The 
empirical analysis focuses primarily on a recent two-year time period spanning from 
August 13th, 2018 through August 13th, 2020. Using difference in means tests this paper 
makes comparisons between the IEX and NYSE American, the two most reputable “speed 
bump” models. Additionally, using ordinary least-squares regressions this paper does an 
extensive analysis of predictors of volume and market share. In-depth review of existing 
literature offers further insight about the IEX and its relationship to trends in market 
microstructure. I find that the IEX has been effective in deterring HFT behavior. This 
research supports the theory of a single market with multiple entry points described by 
O’Hara & Ye (2011) by highlighting how the IEX has become its own unique entry point 
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 Writing a thesis has been the most difficult thing I have ever done in my life. 
More than just being difficult, it has been particularly humbling. Through the 100’s of 
hours I have poured into this, my greatest fear has been answering a huge question about 
market microstructure. With the insight I now have, I realize that it is a rare and powerful 
thing for someone to use research to discover something revolutionary. I have 
continuously put pressure on myself to make this an exceptional contribution to the 
literature. The pressure I have put on myself has been so great that it both nearly broke 
me and nearly prevented the completion of my research. Trying to make this research a 
profound contribution distracted me from the fact that a contribution of any size is all it 
needs to be. My hope now is that this paper is part of the big picture of the fragmented 
market system and one day helps others learn more about the finance industry. 
 The equity market is one of the most delicate and important systems in our world. 
From retail investors all the way up to hedge fund managers, changes in the market can 
change peoples lives. This is what makes this research so important. The IEX started, and 
is part of, a huge trend of continued fragmentation of the market system. As the market 
system changes, people’s lives also stand to be changed either implicitly or explicitly. 
The market matters because people matter. The market changes because people are 
different and because people also change. The truth behind finance, and this paper, is that 
human behavior is what underlies much of what we study.  
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For years the secondary market system in the finance industry has been evolving 
into a prolific environment of exchanges, institutions, traders, brokers, and regulators. 
Around the year 1995, this same market system was predominantly made up of only 5 
exchanges that each operated with analogous functions in relation to each other. In the 
United States there are currently 29 national securities exchanges available for trading 
stocks and options as well as 61 ATS exchanges1. This proliferation of exchanges can be 
attributed in theory to a diverse range of sources and long history of market microstructure 
evolution (O’Hara, 1996; O’Hara & Ye, 2011). The evolution of market microstructure is 
a dynamic blend of innovation, regulation, and interaction within and surrounding the 
markets themselves. 
Many different changes in the financial securities market environment have 
contributed to the current status of market fragmentation for the system as a whole2. These 
trends have spread not only throughout domestic markets but can also be seen abroad 
(Gresse, 2017; O’Hara & Ye, 2011). The history of market fragmentation in the United 
States was a precursor to the formation of the IEX and the IEX is now a unique part of the 
fragmented market system. This chapter analyzes much of the theoretical and empirical 
 
1 Taken from official SEC lists of exchanges and ATS’s. The list of SEC sanctioned exchanges can be 
found at: https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html & the list of SEC 
sanctioned ATS’s can be found at: https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm  
2 See Appendix A for more information on the history of market fragmentation 
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work in market microstructure that relates to the fragmentation of the equity market in the 
U.S. and abroad.  
Radiation within the Market System 
For a quarter of a century, the securities’ market system has been categorized by 
rapid and novel change. An obvious and intuitive source of this expansion and evolution is 
the digital revolution (Hendershott et al., 2011), but the academic community has continued 
to identify other relevant sources. In the past 4 years alone, the number of stock and options 
exchanges has increased by 4, and 21 new SEC-sanctioned ATS exchanges have 
emerged3.As these changes have occurred, a large portion of volume has moved to off-
exchange venues since the admission of Reg NMS (Kwan et al., 2015; O’Hara & Ye, 
2011).  
With this rapid expansion there has been noticeable increases in competition 
between exchanges and between market participators(Boehmer et al., 2018; Hens et al., 
2018; Wang, 2018). Bessembinder & Kaufman (1997) and Bennett & Wei (2006) discuss 
some of the costs to the increased levels of competition while many others have identified 
some of the benefits (Aitken et al., 2017; de Fontnouvelle et al., 2006; O’Hara & Ye, 2011). 
All the while, regulators have attempted to stay on top of protecting a fair market 
environment.  
 Regulation NMS was a huge tipping point for the fragmentation of equities markets 
(Aitken et al., 2017; Kwan et al., 2015; O’Hara & Ye, 2011; Woodward, 2018). In order 
for the IEX to become an exchange, the SEC had to grant an exception to Reg NMS4 due 
 
3 Calculated using current values in comparison to a count done by author Matt Turner in a web article for 




to its new technical innovation: the access delay5. This is largely why the entrance of the 
IEX had such a profound impact on fragmentation. Not only that, but the new change to 
Reg NMS allowed for the entrance of NYSE American, the IntelligentCross dark pool, and 
other access delay venues making the market even more fragmented.  
 New competition between venues in the equity market has continued and evolved 
since the IEX emerged. In 2020 alone, the SEC granted exchange membership to two new 
exchanges: The Member’s Exchange (MEMX) and the Long-Term Stock Exchange 
(LTSE). Both exchanges have mirrored the extensive effort from the IEX to brand 
themselves into a specific niche within the equity market system. Ironically, there is 
indication that the entry of MEMX has been a competitive response to the IEX and other 
venues. Similar to the critique assigned to the BATS exchange in Flash Boys, MEMX has 
received direct support from virtually all prominent market maker institutions known to 
participate heavily in Algorithmic trading, and potentially HFT behavior. In fact, one 
analyst even referred to the exchange as “Bats 2.0” in a Financial Times article6. There is 
a considerable likelihood that MEMX could use attractive fee structures to acquire market 
share so that supporting institutions can capitalize on that market share using HFT or other 
methods.  
 Changes in fragmentation have grown to show the signs of the evolutionary 
principle of adaptive radiation. As more changes arise in the market, there is potential that 
the theory of a single market with multiple entry points presented by O’Hara & Ye (2011) 
could be challenged if increased fragmentation undermines the functions of Reg NMS. 
 




Beyond that, there is risk that predatory behavior could emerge due to a regulatory lag on 
top of existing risks such as flash crashes, deterioration of market quality, or other trends. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to predict what the ideal balance of consolidation versus 
fragmentation is best. The conclusions of Mendelson (1987) how theoretical analyses of 
different market organization to be comparable in quality, but in the presence of trading 
algorithms makes the future of the markets look like they will be fragmented for the 
foreseeable future. 
Market Quality 
New derivations of traders and strategies emerged in tandem with changes in the 
market system. These changes have had impacts on market quality. The degree and 
direction of each of these impacts is somewhat debated, but the general consensus is that 
market fragmentation improves market quality (Aitken et al., 2017). Multiple studies have 
shown that fragmentation reduces spreads, with O’Hara & Ye (2011) finding that “more 
fragmented stocks have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds” and that 
“fragmentation is associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market 
efficiency”. This paradigm study is the primary reference to the theory of the equity market 
acting fully cohesive with multiple points of entry despite fragmentation.  
Interesting research has also been performed on the role that trading skills play in 
fragmentation as a way to measure market quality. Ladley et al. (2015) finds that as the 
intricate web of markets and exchanges has grown to include ECN’s and ATS’ that 
compete with traditional exchanges, the value of trading skills has increased. This research 
was valuable for providing more insight to how a retail investor fits into market 
fragmentation. Their findings are summarized well in this quote: 
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“In centralized markets with many traders, transaction prices tend to be 
efficient, and small market orders tend to have little price impact. Therefore, the 
incentives to acquire skills are weak, and, in equilibrium, most traders are unskilled. 
In fragmented markets, market orders have more price impact. Consequently, 
skilled traders, who quote prices close to fundamental values, make money by 
trading with unskilled traders who do not, and therefore most traders are skilled in 
equilibrium. As a result, fragmented markets are more resilient. Inter-market price 
variation, defined as the variation in prices between trading venues is, however, 
increasing in market fragmentation.” (Ladley et al., 2015) 
 
This study has many findings that are important to this thesis development because this 
thesis originated out of curiosity for how fragmentation impacts the retail investor. The 
discovery that small orders have a negligible impact on price is fundamental support for 
fragmentation’s positive effects since a fragmented market creates so much more liquidity 
in the market. Additionally, this research indicates that there could be a rising number of 
unskilled retail traders.  
 An area that is understudied when it comes to market quality is the impact of HFT 
on market quality. Foucault & Biais (2014) discuss the lack of evidence but point out the 
potential for many negative externalities. Their study investigates policy implications 
behind HFT, specifically as it relates to market quality. The IEX may have potentially 
introduced one of the purported negative externalities through the access because research 
has shown that it may “promote activity detrimental to market quality” (Wah et al., 2017). 
This would be a logical conclusion given that access delays work against the positive 
features of a fragmented market that is connected by electronic behavior. According to that 
research, access delays are a dangerous venue type in a world of make-take fees, execution 
instability and improbability, and long queues.  
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Lit and Dark Liquidity 
A crucial aspect of market fragmentation is the growth of dark trading. Prevalence 
of ATSs and ECNs grows virtually every year and has a dramatic impact on the market. 
Conceptually, dark pools create a safe haven for block trades to occur without damaging 
price discovery for the rest of the market. However, over the past decade the average trade 
size in ATSs venues has decreased considerably (Biedermann, 2015; Kwan et al., 2015). 
In addition to this, dark pools have been the source of some illegal activity7. Despite this, 
dark pools have a distinct competitive advantage in the form of the Increment Rule, the 
part of Reg NMS that has allowed for fragmentation to truly take off (Kwan et al., 2015). 
A concern with dark pools has been the impact it has on order flow and liquidity. 
Gresse (2017) indicates that dark trading and increased fragmentation does not have an 
impact on liquidity. In that study it was also shown that lit fragmentation harms the depth 
of smaller stocks and that HFTs affect the depth of large stocks. With such a large range 
of venue choices, routing choices are difficult to quantify.  
One effect that dark pools have had is queue manipulation. There is evidence from 
multiple studies that “dark pools allow some traders to bypass existing limit order queues 
with minimal price improvement” (Kwan et al., 2015). In fact, ‘queue jumping’ is one of 
the main facilitators of the practice of frontrunning by HFT. This is the practice that the 
IEX was designed to fight against. Not only is frontrunning a predatory side effect of dark 
pools, they also undermine the value that is provided by queue positions for large tick-size 
stocks (Moallemi & Yuan, 2017). There have also been benefits to these trends, however. 




makers across venues and this is seen as a considerable benefit to fragmentation(Aitken et 
al., 2017).  
Impacts of Fragmentation 
The expansion of venues, participants, and entrants within the equity market system 
has created room for more frequent and delicate interactions in response to the many 
exogenous forces at play. There have been concerns voiced by academia that certain 
conditions of fragmentation could be leading markets to be more fractured than fragmented 
(O’Hara & Ye, 2011). This claim can be understood better through the hypothesis that there 
is “a tradeoff in market structure between order flow consolidation and competition among 
market centers” (Bennett & Wei, 2006). Ultimately, as in any evolutionary process, time 
is a huge factor. This is exactly why “the ability to circumvent time priority of displayed 
limit orders is one cause of the rapid rise in US equity market fragmentation” (Kwan et al., 
2015). Digital technology has created time-minimizing processes that have sped up 
fragmentation unthinkable ways. 
With so many changes happening so fast, it is quite logical why such claims have 
been made. A non-intuitive indicator of fragmentation is volume vs. liquidity because 
volume increases with more interactions in the market, but liquidity is more abstract and 
difficult to quantify. This concept is replicated in the information asymmetry between the 
stakeholders in the stock market. A more fragmented market leads to higher potential for 
information asymmetry which is facilitated by an increased number of interactions (Adrian, 
2016). The number of interactions within every aspect of the market system have increased 
synchronously with the size of the system itself. This has occurred not just transactionally 
in the market, but also throughout the processes that lead to market transactions.  
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Regardless of these abstract trends of evolution in the market system, the general 
effect of fragmentation has been discovered to be a positive one. Fragmentation has been 
shown to improve market quality, even as fragmentation has increased (Aitken et al., 2017). 
Not only that, but fragmented markets have been seen to be more resilient than consolidated 
markets (Ladley et al., 2015). One of the most reputable and cited studies on fragmentation 
summarizes more of the effects in their paper’s abstract: 
““We find that fragmentation affects all stocks; more fragmented stocks 
have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds; and fragmentation is 
associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market efficiency, in that 
prices are closer to being a random walk. Our results that fragmentation does not 
appear to harm market quality are consistent with US markets being a single virtual 
market with multiple points of entry”(O’Hara & Ye, 2011) 
 
The hypothesis that the fragmented market has adopted the form of a single, cohesive 
market with multiple entry points has become a focus of this research. Under this 
hypothesis, the role of the IEX could be explained as a new form of entry for a select type 
or number of participants. Ultimately, O’Hara & Ye describe a more important detail about 
fragmentation that transcend the state of the market. That detail is that fragmentation has a 












High-frequency trading has become a controversial buzzword in the finance 
industry in the past several years. One of many testimonies for this is the emergence of the 
IEX and its corresponding novel, Flash Boys by Michael Lewis. To understand high-
frequency trading better, and to use it to under the IEX the market system, it needs to be 
well-defined.  
Computers have facilitated trading in numerous ways. Generally speaking, the use 
of computers to trade is referred to as ‘algorithmic trading’. AT encompasses a wide variety 
of subcategories and has increased dramatically since its inception (Hendershott et al., 
2011). One of the subcategories of AT is high-frequency trading. This is an important 
differentiation because HFT is uniquely based on speed and can often be predatory or 
distasteful.  
The founder of the IEX, Brad Katsuyama was particularly curious when he 
discovered the effects that HFT had on him as a trader on Wall Street. These effects of 
HFT led him to start the IEX and revolutionize the stock market industry. The IEX has 
largely been seen as a “band-aid fix” to HFT(Adrian, 2016), but still indicates that more 
regulation is necessary in the realm AT and HFT. According to St. John (2016), the entry 
of the IEX had less to do with the value proposition of the IEX and more to do with 
repairing the negative perception that had been created by HFT. 
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The Rise of Algorithmic Trading 
The history of AT can be traced in theory all the way back to 1851 when Paul Julius 
Reuter used a cable beneath the English Channel to share stock market quotations. Since 
then, AT has continued to evolve and has increased its pace of growth since the onset of 
the digital revolution8. In the early 2000’s AT had grown rapidly. By 2009 it was believed 
that nearly 73% of volume in the U.S. equity market occurred using AT (Hendershott et 
al., 2011). We now live in a world where our market is defined by, and reliant on the 
presence of ATs to act as market makers and bridge the gaps created by our fragmented 
market system.  
 When a fund manager searches for a broker-dealer to execute a trade or when a 
retail investor works with a financial institution to update their portfolio those interactions 
lead to the use of ATs. Prior to AT, these interactions would have led to a broker-dealer 
work the floor of the NYSE to execute the trade at the fairest prices. At codified that 
process. In fact, AT has come so far along that the NYSE was able to operate with an empty 
trading floor during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic9. Not only have ATs 
improved flexibility for investors, the have lowered transaction costs and increased volume 
across the board (Menkveld, 2016). 
High-Frequency Infrastructure 
As previously noted, speed is a crucial differentiator for an AT to be considered 
HFT. The phenomenon underlying the need for speed in HFT is an arm’s race for faster 
connections to exchange matching centers. In Flash Boys, Katsuyama learned of this early 
 
8 See Appendix B for a concise and interesting history on AT since 1851. 
9 See this article from the NY Post about the COVID-19 shut-down at NYSE: 
https://nypost.com/2020/03/18/nyse-to-shut-down-trading-floor-monday-due-to-coronavirus/ 
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on and it helped lead him to IEX co-founder, Ronan Ryan. The novel even begins with a 
primer on the HFT Arm’s Race in the form of the Spread Networks dark fiber line Budish 
et. al (2015) finds that this is evidence of a flawed market design because the mechanical 
capabilities of a continuous limit order book break down at high-frequency time scales.  
The mechanical flaw in market design as it relates to HFT occurs primarily because 
of the Order Protection Rule, which is part of the Reg NMS implemented by the SEC. The 
order protection rules requires that exchanges must route orders to other exchanges if those 
exchanges have better prices. Wang (2018) succinctly describes the impact that the HFT 
Arm’s Race has on the market system and investors: 
“Faster exchanges attract more price-improving limit orders because the 
probability of being bypassed by trades with inferior prices on other exchanges is 
reduced. When all exchanges speed up, this probability can increase, potentially 
harming the welfare of investors. In contrast, increasing connection speeds between 
exchanges raises investor welfare by reducing this probability. Nevertheless, no 
exchange wants to improve connection speeds because this will reduce its trading 
volume 
 
Similarly, Budish et. al (2015) provided a theoretical alternative in the form of batch 
auction matching in response to the issue of the mechanical infrastructure in market design. 
In their research, they compared time-series data using minutes as a standard versus 250 
milliseconds to highlight the clear mechanical arbitrage available to the fastest HFT actors. 
They found that “arbitrage opportunities decline dramatically, from a median of 97 
milliseconds in 2005 to a median of 7 milliseconds in 2011”. 
Front-Running 
Prior references to ‘mechanical arbitrage’ are a reference to the practice of ‘front-
running’ that is used by HFT firms for profits. Due to the implementation of Reg NMS, 
there is an unavoidable latency issue due to the travel times of trade signals. Although these 
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latency times are typically faster than the blink of an eye—under 20 millionths of a 
second—it is still slow enough for very fast computers running HFT algorithms to shave 
pennies off millions of trades per day. Front running can be further defined as “using the 
knowledge of a large impending trade to take a favorable position in the market before that 
trade is executed.” (Adrian, 2016). 
Front running is what occurred behind the scenes of Katsuyama’s trading desk that 
led him to create the IEX. The IEX has become a market response to the problem of HFT 
and front-running. Although this has been seemingly effective, a market-based solution to 
a regulated environment is certainly less than ideal. According to Menkveld (2016), 
“electronic markets without HFTs could [perhaps] produce an even better service at a lower 
cost.” Unfortunately, it has become natural for the growth of fragmentation to happen in 
step with the growth of inefficiencies despite any associated benefits.  
The SEC offers data visualization tools on a variety of market metrics. One of those 
metrics is the trade-to-order volume ratios on given dates. This metric indicates the number 
how many trades are actually executed versus placed. Intuitively, the number of trades is 
less than the number of orders. However, only roughly 70% of orders are executed 
compared to the number of orders canceled. Figure 1 shows 
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Figure 1 - Trade-to-Order Ratios in the U.S. (SEC) 
A Discrete Issue with HFT 
A blog post10 by Economist David Glasner dives into one of the most interesting 
viewpoints about ‘the real problem’ with HFT: social waste and the economics of 
information. There are understandable  truths behind the laments of Michael Lewis in his 
book about the IEX. HFT has been shown to lower costs, to lower bid-ask spreads, and add 
liquidity to the market. However, Glasner argues that it misses the point about HFT’s 
shortcomings using classic economics articles. He first explains a book by Thorstein 
Veblen called The Theory of the Leisure Class which highlights the social waste that 
engineers create by using their skills to contribute to the luxury of the leisure class without 
adding true value to society (Veblen, 1994). Then, he brings up a paper by Jack Hirshleifer 
that discusses the economics of information (Hirshleifer, 1978).  
What does the leisure class and the economics of information have to do with HFT? 
The answer is humbling. The essential theory is that the world’s best and brightest minds 
are being used to shave millionths of second off trades using computer algorithms instead 
 
10 Read the opinion by Glasner here: https://uneasymoney.com/2014/04/08/the-real-problem-with-high-
frequency-trading/ 
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of being used to solve issues for society. HFT is the source of massive social waste and 
significant market efficiency. For example, Jurich et al. (2020) uncovered that ATs are 
more likely to cancel their orders in normal market conditions. The behavioral conditions 
from their study support the theory that ATs create inefficiencies in society for the benefit 
of those who create and own the algorithms.  
Impact of AT & HFT 
The truth about AT and HFT is that they have forever changed our market system. 
Algorithms provide a trading avenue that reaches volumes that would be impossible using 
archaic methods. HFT is estimated to be “responsible for around seventy percent of all 
equity trading volume on U.S. markets, HFT algorithms must be precision programmed to 
capture enormous amounts of data and to rapidly extract meaning from this input” (Yadav, 
2014). Speed is hugely important and was directly related to the co-location of servers. The 
rest stakeholders in the market are subject to this either directly or indirectly. 
Case Study: The 2015-2016 Stock Market Selloff 
The flash crash of 2010 is often the most talked about event in the lifetime of HFT 
and AT. A highly interesting discovery that I made about the impact of HFT was the 2015-
2016 stock market sell-off in the U.S. due to turbulence in the Chinese economy. During 
that time, the cancel-trade ratio spiked to an unprecedented level on the NSX and the CHX 
Exchanges. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show two different views of this data where it shows the 
dramatic cancel-to-trade ratio of over 400 cancels per single trade made.  
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Figure 2 - U.S. Exchange Cancel-to-Trade Ratio View 1 (SEC) 
 
Figure 3 - U.S. Exchange Cancel-to-Trade Ratio View 2 (SEC) 
 
This event is believed to be initiated by a Chinese policy where state owned banks 
were required to give a lot of loans to state-owned companies “even at the expense of risk-





This derived from a $600 billion stimulus bailout in 2008 that led to more state bank 
lending. Money supply grew like crazy, led to asset bubbles in market around the world. 
In the U.S. it was first a real estate bubble, then stock prices inflated. This also happened 
in the Shanghai exchange where the stock market jumped 150% in one year. 
 The interesting thing about this event is that the spike in U.S. cancel-to-trade 
occurred only on two exchanges in the U.S. markets while the rest of the markets remained 
largely unaffected in this statistic. Where it really gets interesting is the discovery that these 
two exchanges are two of the primary exchanges that have connection to the dark-fiber line 
laid by Spread Networks. Additionally, the CHX Exchange had been purchased by a 
number of high-profile Chinese investors12 Although it is still only speculation, the two 
exchanges have undisputable connections to the realm of AT. These connections create 
logical skepticism about how the algorithms interacted with each other in light of the 
exogenous events in China.  
 











Emergence of the IEX 
 
 According to Flash Boys, the Investors Exchange arose out of Brad Katsuyama’s 
serendipitous side-project of discovering why his trading screens were less predictable than 
they once were. Katsuyama’s ventures took him into meetings with a large number of major 
players on Wall Street. Along the way, he was introduced to key figures that contributed 
to the exchange’s emergence such as Ronan Ryan and Rob Park. Michael Lewis’ novel is 
the primary existing account of the early development of the IEX, but it only tells one 
version of the story.  
 It has become commonplace to associate the IEX with HFT’s in both the literature 
and in financial world. This connection is due largely to the effect of Flash Boys on the 
image of HFT. Regardless of Flash Boys, the motives behind creating the IEX were spurred 
along by the prevalence and impact of HFT’s and algorithmic trading (Wah et al., 2017; 
Woodward, 2018). Research has extended beyond this to show that there are causal effects 
between speed and competition for market share among exchanges (Wang, 2018).   
Exchange Function Innovation: The “Speed” Bump 
Securities markets differentiate themselves based on their chosen set of trading 
variables. Liquidity provisions, fee structures, and auxiliary features of exchanges are 
decided upon and adjusted to maximize attraction to buyers and sellers. Every party in the 
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market system is in search of a competitive advantage. Those not actively searching for a 
new advantage at least stand to gain from finding one.  
Regardless of motive from Katsuyama or others, the IEX ‘Speed Bump’ was 
created in direction reaction to an “increasing prevalence of HFT” (Woodward, 2018). To 
address these concerns, the exchange did two primary things: created a fee structure that 
does not use rebates to attract liquidity13, and created proprietary trade function in the form 
of the Discretionary Limit (D-Limit) Peg Order Type 14. The IEX has taken a revolutionary 
stance in the market by not using rebates. Katsuyama stands by this choice because he 
believes it is a core part of their model not to use rebates to attract liquidity15.  
The D-Limit order type is a non-displayed order that rests on the IEX and waits for 
orders to be routed to their exchange. It is the primary proprietary technology that relies on 
the IEX access delay. Simply put, the D-Limit order uses its own algorithm that is modelled 
to combat HFT frontrunning. Bishop (2017), an employee of the IEX, explains the 
approach in an intuitive way: “Our approach instead is to shape the solution to match the 
problem: we can fight math with math! If others are leveraging short term prediction 
models to anticipate NBBO changes, than we can build such a model our-selves and deploy 
it to protect resting orders.”  
There is a notion about the IEX that instead of emerging from a crusade for a 
progressive competitive advantage in the secondary market system, the goodwill of an 
exclusive group of righteous martyrs took the initiative to fix the HFT problem. It is 
seeming to be more than a coincidence that the speed bump could be a competitive 
 
13 See Appendices D and E to view the fee schedule for the IEX 
14 See Appendix F for more information on the D-Limit Order Type from the IEX 
15 More about Katsuyama’s position can be read here: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/iex-ceo-
katsuyama-stands-firm-on-exchanges-fee-only-model-2016-06-21 
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advantage for exchanges, but research has yet to make concrete conclusions. Witness to 
this is the rise of IEX doppelgangers such as NYSE American, the Chicago Stock Exchange 
LEAD program, the Nasdaq Extended Life order designation, or the IntelligentCross dark 
pool16.  
There is great optimism in the belief that allowing the IEX’s new model to exist in 
the secondary market system was an unintended benefit from the exchange’s true ambition. 
With over 100% growth in their market share between 2016 and 202017, the lingering 
question is whether this nascent exchange created a true and effective innovation for 
















Originally this project began due to a high interest in the world of ‘Finance Twitter’ 
and the behavior of retail investors that use Twitter to network and learn from other traders. 
Along the way it was clear that the retail investor is only on the surface of the securities 
markets. Trends in equity market microstructure such as dark pools, payment for order 
flow, algorithmic trading and HFT, and fee structures uncovered where there is a deeper 
need for research. It was at this point that my advisor shared Flash Boys with me. This 
novel by Michael Lewis inspired discussions about the IEX, predatory behavior in HFT, 
the physical infrastructure of the markets, and many others. These discussions were a 
dynamic part of the financial world, and also a dynamic part of the hypotheses in this thesis.  
A driving force behind this project has been the ethical discussion created by Flash 
Boys. How much HFT behavior is predatory? What is the relationship that has emerged 
between HFT’s and opposing venues? How does this impact theories that HFT companies 
are marker makers? These discussions are subsidiary view of the entire fragmented system 
but they each explain more about how and where the IEX fits in. The trends of market 
microstructure that have been previously discussed are further dimensions of the story of 
the IEX and fragmentation. The hypothesis’ in this section developed from various 
literature involving the IEX and venues with access delays. These are the testable 
predictions intended to assist in providing a substantive contribution to the literature. 
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Effectiveness and Integrity of the IEX 
 Since its inception, the IEX has attempted to differentiate itself by creating and 
marketing a high level of fairness and integrity. On their website they claim that “IEX sets 
new standards by raising the bar for performance, fairness, and transparency.”18 This 
standard they have set for themselves as an exchange is meant to go hand in hand with their 
access delay model. According to the IEX, the speed bump was created to “protect 
investors from potentially harmful trading that may involve the front-running of orders” 
(Pisani, 2016). This claim was genuine enough in the eyes of the SEC to permit the speed 
bump model to exist five years ago19.  
Since then, how has the speed bump faired against HFT? Chow et. al (2020) showed 
that the IEX provides a low realized half-spread and thus a low cost to investors indicating 
that the IEX has had success in their mission. Hu’s (2019) findings showed that stocks that 
have spent a long-time trading on the IEX have higher decreases in trading costs than other 
stocks. This research indicated that the amount of frontrunning was reduced, supporting 
the IEX’s goal of deterring HFT’s as well. Besides these, there is little other research that 
supports or denies the theory. 
Hypothesis 1 – The IEX has been successful in deterring HFT behavior on their exchange 
 Academic research on access delay exchanges is somewhat uncomprehensive given 
the novelty of the exchange design. The entry of the IEX allowed for research on market 
quality by examining various metrics such as price efficiency and transaction costs 





has contributing to answering this hypothesis. To contribute further to the literature, the 
following sub-hypotheses are testable inquiries that have guided the empirical analysis of 
this work. Hypothesis 1 focuses on analyzing the interaction between HFT with the theory 
behind the IEX access delay model. Beyond this, there are also implications for the impacts 
seen by a retail investor on IEX. This hypothesis is similar to that of Chow et. al (2020) 
who used the entry of the IEX as an event to analyze market quality metrics. 
Access Delay Benchmarking 
 In order for the IEX to enter as an exchange, the SEC adopted a new interpretation 
of the Order Protection Rule as part of Reg NMS. This interpretation was the basis for 
allowing venues to implement access delays. Access delays create intentional latency on 
orders and executions so that the exchange can improve its control over the transactions. 
Hypothesis 2 – Of exchanges with speed bumps, the IEX has captured more market share 
than other exchanges  
 Now that many venues have adopted the model, who has had success? I posit that 
the IEX has captured the most market share for two reasons. First, they were the first 
exchange with an access delay, so they have had a head start on competitors. Second, the 
IEX has specifically adopted and marketed themselves as being the most transparent and 
fair exchange available to investors.  
Ethical Exchange Design  
Uncovering the role of the IEX in the market system is a task that prompts for more 
information about the integrity of their exchange. The emergence of the IEX was a highly 
poignant event in the history of financial markets. In fact, the SEC received over 500 
comment letters in a 10-month period during the approval process (Wah et al., 2017). By 
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comparison, the entry of BATS and EDGX resulted in only four total comment letters 
during their approval processes (Hu, 2019). The IEX sparked a tense discussion among 
community members and Flash Boys amplified the emotion behind the situation. This 
emotion was certainly tied to the financial implications behind the new exchange model. 
However, given the substantial and emotional response it would make sense that the IEX 
discussion went even deeper and probed the moral viewpoints of community members. 
The profound response to the IEX and the changes to Reg NMS that permitted access 
delays have inspired the penultimate hypothesis for this work.  
Hypothesis 3 – There is a desire and/or incentive for investors to use a more “ethical” 
exchange design than an “unethical” exchange design 
 It can be cleared seen from Flash Boys that there is a desire for a higher standard 
of ethics in the securities market. A more poignant view is that there is a desire to minimize 
unfair behavior. With the IEX mission being to create this type of investing environment 
it brings up the question of choice for investors. Does the access delay truly limit 
frontrunning and the informational inequality described by Adrian (2016). How does the 
effect of the access delay create incentives for consumers? Under the assumption that 
rational shareholders aim to maximize their return, a primary measure for this will be the 
degree that the IEX reduces slippage on trades (Bishop, 2017).  
Hypothesis 3a – The IEX has generally been more successful than NYSE American as an 
exchange. 
 Although the NYSE American also has an access delay, the IEX is still the initial 
proprietor of the access delay. Additionally, the IEX started with a distinct vision and 
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mission for their exchange. NYSE American was largely a market response to the traction 
the IEX built up in the industry, and to the opportunity created by the SEC’s approval for 
access delays to exist. Ultimately, this can be tested softly by seeing which exchange grew 
faster in its early years, and which exchange is more effective in deterring HFT. 
Additionally, exchange volume and market share growth over time is a reasonable 
indicator. 
In Flash Boys an adversarial narrative was created around the IEX and BATS. This 
narrative, widely controversial in the financial community, paints IEX as the hero and 
BATS as a villain. One of the striking historical events in this process is a fight that 
occurred between IEX founder, Brad Katsuyama, and BATS Global Markets’ President, 
William O’Brien, live on CNBC20. The debate ensued on the CNBC set that is located on 
the trading floor of the NYSE. It is reported that the event completely halted trading on the 
NYSE trading floor as traders turned to listen in, and that ‘Finance Twitter’ slowed 
significantly as well21. Now that much of the drama has passed, analyzing the success of 
the IEX and NYSE American against BATS can offer insight to the discussion and where 
it led.  
Critics of BATS claim that the exchange was founded with key support from firms 
participating in HFT behavior. After its inception, BATS purportedly structured their fee 
schedule and business plan in a way to siphon liquidity from the NYSE and NASDAQ to 
allow HFT firms to capitalize on the trades being made there. With the beliefs that the IEX 
has maintained the integrity that they have claimed to operate with and that investors desire 
 




ethical markets, it would be logical that the IEX has had more success during its early 
lifespan than BATS. These two sub-hypotheses were developed to help assess how each 
exchange’s early success impacted the ethical narrative that Flash Boys and the IEX 
initiated around the presence of HFT.  
Hypothesis 4 – The IEX has increased in their ability to capture liquidity by using their 
proprietary IEX signal under the protection of a discretionary peg order 
 This hypothesis was incepted early in the research process but evolved later once 
its testability was discovered. The competitive advantage of the IEX revolves around their 
access delay. However, if a venue is trying to acquire more liquidity, why would it create 
intentional latency that limits the volume potential of their exchange? The answer lies in 
what happens during the 350-millisecond access delay used by the IEX, and that answer is 
the discretionary peg (D-Peg) order type. The D-Peg order on the IEX is a non-displayed, 
resting order that uses proprietary technology to prevent “slippage”22 on trade executions. 
Their technology serves as an active price-updating tool that utilizes the time provided by 
their access delay to identify “crumbling quotes”, quotes that indicate slippage on trades, 
and re-price the trade at the NBBO before the order executes at an unfavorable price. Since 
the IEX has invested significant resources into branding and marketing their transparent 
operations, they have provided educational resources that make it easier to conceptualize 
their value propositions to traders23. 
  
 
22 Slippage refers to small loses on trades during their execution. HFT algorithms send odd-lot-sized trades 
to search for resting orders. During this first wave process, HFT algorithms progressively send larger orders 
to exchanges that have resting liquidity but do so at less favorable prices each time. 











The approach for this empirical analysis was chosen in attempt to answer the 
primary research question: how does the IEX play a role in market fragmentation? To 
properly address how the IEX fits into market fragmentation, it was essential to focus on 
the IEX relative to other exchanges. There were three focus exchanges in the study in 
addition to the IEX. NYSE American is the main comparison exchange to the IEX because 
it also has an access delay. The NYSE physical location is the iconic ‘big board’ and this 
exchange was used alongside the NASDAQ Book as a proxy for the displayed market. 
Focusing on these exchanges created a manageable scope for the analysis without 
sacrificing explanatory power. Conclusions on HFT behavior and the impact of access 
delays are also provided by this analysis since the data is divided into odd-lots and non-
odd-lots, a proxy for HFT. 
Part of addressing the primary research question is analyzing market fragmentation. 
Explaining fragmentation is a complex task because it draws from an intricate blend of 
events and phenomena, past and present. Understanding the role of the IEX within 
fragmentation is a challenge due to the how abstract a concept fragmentation is. The 
empirical approach for this analysis was created to contribute to the literature surrounding 
the IEX but also offers insight to market fragmentation. 
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 Statistical methods used include first-difference t-tests and ordinary least squares 
regressions. These two methods were useful for the analysis because they allowed for 
numerous tests using the full selection of sample data. Market share and volume along with 
the odd-lots proxy offer a large amount of insight. There is even more insight for the IEX 
from combining market share and volume along with the IEX monthly and daily statistics. 
Additionally, there is further insight from the CBOE data because it was separated into 
Tape A, Tape B, and Tape C share types. 
Sample Selection 
Sample Period 
The empirical analysis uses a sample period from August 13th, 2018 through August 
13th, 2020. This sample period originated from dataset that was initially collected for a 
working paper that focuses on exchange fees (Jurich, 2021). The sample begins in the 
middle of the month to account for changes in fee structures. Changes in fee structures do 
not directly impact this analysis. This data was the basis for my sample selection to 
facilitate collaboration efforts with my advisor. Additionally, it was a recent time period 
that allowed for a relevant analysis of the IEX. There is no other association between the 
two research projects and their use of this sample period. 
Data Selection 
Numerous data points were chosen to address the IEX and market fragmentation. 
Data was chosen first for the entire market for use in analyzing market fragmentation 
during the sample period. Data from the IEX was then chosen in order to perform a focused 
analysis of the IEX during the sample period. 
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 The initial data selection included volume and market 
share for 13 exchanges and three TRFs. This data included volume and market share for 
Tape A, Tape B, and Tape C share types as well as for the total market. These data points 
were collected twice. First, they were collected with odd-lots included. Next, they were 
collected without including odd-lot shares. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 
shares or less. 
 After choosing data for the entire market, 
various data was gathered for the IEX in order to expand the sample. Various metrics were 
gathered on either a daily or monthly basis depending on what was available. Monthly 
metrics included: average routed volume, average matched volume, average market share, 
average order size, average aggregate fill size, the percentage of aggregate fills by trade 
size for nine different trade sizes24, the number of block trades for three different block 
trade sizes25, unique symbols traded, average daily symbols traded, the percentage of trades 
made in block sizes, the number of broker members, the percent of broker self-cross26, first 
wave rate27, and first wave fill rate28. Daily metrics include total shares handled, routed 
volume, matched volume, lit volume, and market share. For further information on these 
data points visit the IEX website29. Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015) used information 
about dark pools to discuss block trades which has inspired the use of block trade 
percentage. 
 
24 Trade sizes: Under 100 shares, 100-199 shares, 200-299 shares, 300-399 shares, 400-499 shares, 500-999 
shares, 1,000-4,999 shares, 5,000-9,999 shares, over 10,000 shares. 
25 Block trade sizes: 10,000-19,999 shares, 20,000-49,999 shares, 50,000 shares. 
26 These are trades internalized by a broker member and then reported to the exchange.  
27 First wave trade fill weight is the percentage of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given 
exchange on the trade’s first routed signal. 
28 The first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of either the order size or the 
number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the smaller of the two denominator options. 
29 https://iextrading.com/stats/ 
Market Share and Volume.




 The core dataset for this analysis was compiled using two sources: CBOE Global 
Markets and the IEX. CBOE Global Markets and IEX both offers a variety of public data 
through their websites. The IEX also has data that is accessible through their API. Market 
share and volume statistics for Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and the total market were collected 
from CBOE Global Market’s website. All IEX daily and monthly stats were collected from 
either the IEX website or through the IEX API using Python. 
Data Tools 
  Data collection, storage, preparation, and analysis were performed using three 
primary tools: Python, IBM SPSS, and Microsoft Excel. Python was utilized for data 
collection through web scraping and IEX API calls. The coding language was also used to 
manipulate CSV files into a usable format for Excel or SPSS. Excel was used to store and 
prepare data that was collected through Python, CSV downloads, or copy and pasting. IBM 
SPSS was used to store prepared data and is the statistical package that was used for all 
data analysis. 
Data Collection Methods 
 Market share and volume data collected from 
CBOE Global Market was performed using CSV file downloads for each trading day in 




30 Collected from CBOE Global Markets at https://www.cboe.com/us/equities/market_share/market/  
CBOE Global Markets Data30.
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 Statistics for the IEX were collected using Python 
web scraping, through calls to the IEX API, and through copy and pasting from the IEX 
website32. Web scraping was used to collect the first wave weight and first wave fill data 
points from the IEX website. This method was used due to a bug encountered while trying 
to access the data through the IEX API. Historical monthly statistics for the IEX were 
collected using calls to the IEX API. Finally, daily statistics for the IEX were collected 
using a simple copy and paste into Excel. Daily statistic access on the IEX API was in a 
beta phase during data collection so copy and paste was the simplest solution. 
Methodology 
The empirical portion of this study was a quantitative analysis of the previously 
described data. To analyze the data in the sample I first reported descriptive statistics for 
each category of selected data. For my inferential analysis I utilized two statistical methods: 
first-difference t-tests and ordinary least squares regression. The basis for each analysis in 
this study is that volume and market share data is used with odd-lots and without odd-lots. 
Market share and volume data from the CBOE shows a full picture of the 
fragmented market, including the IEX. This data also has been divided into Tape A, Tape 
B, and Tape C shares to analysis market trends based on listing venue. This data has also 
been collected without odd-lots because it serves as a proxy for High-Frequency traders 
(O’Hara et al., 2014; Roseman et al., n.d.). Monthly and daily statistics from the IEX allow 
for insight into which factors might explain changes in their volume or market share. 
 
31 Collected from the IEX. Data can be viewed on their website at https://iextrading.com/stats/  
32 The program written to perform web scraping and API calls was mistakenly overwritten after the data 
collection process and are not available for viewing in the appendices. 
IEX Daily and Monthly Data31.
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Creating a scope for the analysis involved focusing on a select number of 
exchanges. The analysis uses the NYSE and NASDAQ as constants for the overall market 
since they make up such a large amount of total displayed market volume. Additionally, 
the NYSE American exchange is used in the analysis as a comparison exchange for the 
IEX because it is the other major access delay exchange. Much of the analysis is done 
between the IEX and NYSE American. Odd-lots were used for each exchange to 
investigate and compare HFT behavior. Monthly and daily statistics were used solely for 
the IEX.  
Difference tests in this analysis are used in the univariate and ordinary least squares 
regression are used in the multivariate. Each dependent variable (either volume or market 
share in every model) is used both with and without odd-lots. O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) 
explain that odd lots are increasingly used in algorithmic and high frequency trading. 
Similarly, Johnson, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2017) analyze odd-lot transactions by order 
submission type. Menkveld (2013) shows that HFT activity is higher on volatile, high-












 Assembly of the master dataset for this analysis was a long and somewhat 
unconventional process. The data was prepared as it was collected and was done so in 
sequential order. First, the market share and volume data from the CBOE was collected 
followed by the monthly IEX data and then the daily IEX data. After data collection, the 
data was prepared in Excel and then exported to SPSS. Within SPSS the data was used to 
compute new variables and code binary dummy variables for use in the statistical analysis. 
 Preparing the market share and volume data from CBOE Global Markets involved 
downloading CSV files, writing and running Python code to combine and organize the data 
within those files, cross-checking the output in Excel, and then exporting the data to SPSS. 
Each CSV file from the CBOE represented one day of trading in the market. These files 
could only be downloaded containing odd-lots or omitting odd lots so two CSV files were 
downloaded for each trading day in the sample. These files were placed in separate folders 
so that all CSVs for the odd-lots data was in one folder and all non-odd-lots data was in a 
different folder. Using the pandas library and glob module in Python, I wrote a program33 
that parsed through each folder and combined all of the files into a single data frame. To 
divide the data into appropriate categories, I wrote another program34 to separate Tape A, 
 
33 See Appendix C 
34 See Appendix C 
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Tape B, and Tape C categories from the total market. The final program35 I wrote created 
a separate data frame that removed the TRF categories of volume and market share to 
display only equity exchanges. After exporting the final data frame to Excel, I manually 
checked that the program executed properly by examining the data. Finally, I imported the 
data into SPSS for analysis.  
 Data from the IEX required extensive preparation. Since the data was collected in 
both daily and monthly forms and was collected using three separate methods, the 
preparation process varied. Most of the data preparation occurred manually to circumvent 
the need for a complex program or external assistance. The primary challenge with 
preparing the IEX data was matching data with appropriate dates. For the daily IEX 
statistics, each data point was manually checked and aligned with its appropriate date. For 
the monthly IEX statistics, data points were duplicated across every date within the 
corresponding month. It is important to note that all monthly data points in the master 
dataset were duplicated and used on a daily basis for the corresponding month. As with the 
CBOE data, IEX statistics were prepared in Excel before being imported into SPSS. 
 Final preparation for the dataset required computing adjusted variables and creating 
binary variables. Since the dataset included both volume and market share, volume had to 
be adjusted using the natural logarithm of each data point. This occurred for each data point 
representing volume. Interaction variables were also computed for use in the multivariate 
analyses. Interaction variables were computed by taking the product of two other data 
points. Finally, binary dummy variables were coded for each exchange.  
 
35 See Appendix C 
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 The final dataset contained 88 variables using all the collected data. Every variable 
contained up to 7935 total observations. There were 20 nominal variables and 68 ordinal 







Table I – Volume by Exchange 
These tables contain descriptive statistics for volume the four sample exchanges in 
the empirical portion of this study: the IEX, NYSE American, NYSE, and NASDAQ. This 
data is listed in Panels A-D below with each panel representing a respective exchange. 
Volume is measured as the single-counted sum of shares traded on an exchange. Odd-lots 
refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares or less and the data is reported with odd lots 
and without odd-lots. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 
2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample 
selection includes two primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two 
largest venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one 
of these four exchanges. 
 
Panel A: IEX Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 







s  Tape A 505 123,741,927 38,156,866 37,994,990 354,821,017 
Tape B 505 22,731,102 10,168,228 8,476,227 81,420,230 
Tape C 505 64,700,435 17,001,450 21,895,529 169,483,798 
Market 








s  Tape A 505 118,601,154 37,199,743 35,916,277 344,274,411 
Tape B 505 22,276,583 10,026,254 8,270,128 80,424,447 
Tape C 505 61,541,148 16,352,674 20,845,869 162,638,103 
Market 
Total 505 202,418,885 61,822,831 65,692,601 566,889,380 
Table 1 - IEX Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots  
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Panel B: NYSE American Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
NYSE American 







s  Tape A 505 7,728,425 3,903,127 2,117,862 28,095,666 
Tape B 505 15,058,628 7,810,282 5,310,685 58,475,358 
Tape C 505 3,977,312 1,981,022 1,371,621 12,296,252 








s Tape A 505 6,918,151 3,547,325 1,864,050 27,863,926 
Tape B 505 14,431,443 7,541,253 5,165,493 56,464,277 
Tape C 505 3,548,604 1,768,273 1,216,985 11,196,129 
Market Total 505 24,898,198 12,084,741 9,037,634 92,265,155 
Table 2 - NYSE American Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
Panel C: NYSE Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 







s  Tape A 505 607,218,125 179,172,751 202,703,417 1,559,868,639 
Tape B 505 46,666,551 19,956,791 13,635,105 174,426,101 
Tape C 505 41,951,205 12,510,134 13,112,207 96,991,248 
Market 








s  Tape A 505 549,192,212 167,824,713 143,844,007 1,448,105,623 
Tape B 505 55,651,452 58,576,193 13,329,077 674,556,026 
Tape C 505 47,026,182 42,044,267 12,042,900 339,418,541 
Market 
Total 505 651,869,847 190,133,080 212,967,717 1,707,250,303 
Table 3 - NYSE Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
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Panel D: NASDAQ Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
NASDAQ 







s  Tape A 505 500,844,645 165,457,690 127,333,847 1,143,726,077 
Tape B 505 217,750,887 102,812,082 58,980,002 817,897,193 
Tape C 505 559,627,488 199,213,937 201,357,028 1,294,372,787 








s  Tape A 505 434,678,771 143,663,456 106,871,418 1,017,658,914 
Tape B 505 209,478,750 98,127,876 56,727,627 787,771,142 
Tape C 505 486,288,375 174,063,362 172,288,389 1,163,979,193 
Market Total 505 1,130,445,896 391,641,515 335,887,434 2,755,338,113 
Table 4 - NASDAQ with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
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Table II – Market Share by Venue 
These tables contain descriptive statistics for market share the four sample 
exchanges in the empirical portion of this study: the IEX, NYSE American, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ. This data is listed in Panels A-D below with each panel representing a 
respective exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares or less and the 
data is reported with odd lots and without odd-lots. The sample period spans from August 
13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 
trading days. This sample selection includes two primary access delay venues (IEX & 
NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each 
panel in this table displays one of these four exchanges. 
 
Panel A: IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
IEX Market 







s  Tape A 505 3.325% 0.410% 2.132% 4.369% -0.465 
Tape B 505 1.435% 0.210% 0.782% 1.986% -0.536 
Tape C 505 2.664% 0.539% 1.135% 3.914% -0.922 
Market 








s  Tape A 505 3.420% 0.427% 2.178% 4.587% -0.364 
Tape B 505 1.442% 0.209% 0.783% 1.995% -0.519 
Tape C 505 2.741% 0.570% 1.133% 4.141% -0.849 
Market 
Total 505 2.786% 0.418% 1.571% 3.762% -0.829 
Table 5 - IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
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Panel B: NYSE American Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
NYSE American 







s  Tape A 505 0.199% 0.045% 0.130% 0.375% 1.548 
Tape B 505 0.955% 0.317% 0.323% 2.164% 0.852 
Tape C 505 0.152% 0.033% 0.085% 0.269% 0.798 








s Tape A 505 0.192% 0.046% 0.123% 0.480% 2.104 
Tape B 505 0.940% 0.318% 0.320% 2.147% 0.888 
Tape C 505 0.148% 0.041% 0.081% 0.477% 3.058 
Market Total 505 0.327% 0.075% 0.198% 0.689% 1.029 
Table 6 - NYSE American Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
Panel C: NYSE Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
NYSE Market 







s Tape A 505 16.271% 1.280% 12.455% 23.948% -0.148 
Tape B 505 2.947% 0.568% 1.515% 4.627% -0.099 
Tape C 505 1.684% 0.278% 1.114% 2.577% 0.151 
Market 








s  Tape A 505 15.914% 2.451% 4.998% 23.948% -2.665 
Tape B 505 3.466% 2.483% 1.532% 18.483% 4.91 
Tape C 505 1.972% 1.276% 1.093% 8.867% 4.108 
Market 
Total 505 8.922% 0.977% 5.963% 13.539% -0.729 
Table 7 - NYSE Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
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Panel D: NASDAQ Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
 
NASDAQ 







s Tape A 505 13.259% 1.219% 9.808% 16.606% 0.14 
Tape B 505 13.484% 1.407% 9.852% 18.451% 0.428 
Tape C 505 21.960% 1.431% 18.103% 25.990% -0.041 
Market 








s Tape A 505 12.360% 1.182% 8.874% 15.583% 0.076 
Tape B 505 13.338% 1.402% 9.675% 18.349% 0.392 
Tape C 505 20.604% 1.339% 16.885% 24.377% -0.068 
Market 
Total 505 15.149% 0.943% 11.771% 17.872% -0.082 
Table 8 - NASDAQ Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots 
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Table III – IEX Volume 
The table here displays descriptive statistics for different sub-categories of volume 
on the IEX. Volume is measured by the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on the 
IEX. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample 
contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days on the IEX during the 
sample period.  
 
Volume by Type on IEX 
Volume Type N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total Volume 505 244,900,402 73,885,664 77,453,934 678,665,029 
 Routed Volume 505 34,061,269 10,655,123 8,106,084 93,515,474 
 Matched Volume 505 210,839,133 64,348,784 69,347,850 585,149,555 
 Displayed Volume 505 41,463,696 15,114,474 8,783,027 90,278,928 
Table 9 - Volume by Type on IEX 
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Table IV – IEX Trade Size 
This table displays descriptive statistics for monthly aggregate trade sizes on the 
IEX. Trade size is determined in the sample as being the percentage of filled orders in each 
range of share amounts on an aggregate basis. The sample period spans from August 2018 
to August 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading 
days on the IEX during the sample period. 
 
Percent of Aggregate Fills by Trade Size 
Share Size N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
< 100 505 73.634% 1.419% 70.100% 76.480% -0.551 
100 - 199 505 2.308% 0.470% 1.540% 3.200% 0.315 
200 - 299 505 10.744% 0.608% 9.280% 12.930% 1.648 
300 - 399 505 4.516% 0.232% 4.060% 4.990% 0.106 
400 - 499 505 2.324% 0.168% 1.960% 2.820% 0.318 
500 - 999 505 3.974% 0.273% 3.560% 4.510% 0.284 
1000 - 4999 505 2.260% 0.199% 1.970% 2.740% 0.777 
5000 - 9999 505 0.162% 0.017% 0.140% 0.210% 1.246 
10000 < 505 0.083% 0.010% 0.070% 0.110% 0.907 
Table 10 - IEX Trade Sizes 
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Table V – IEX Block Trade Size 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the monthly number of trades made in 
block sizes. A block size trade is a very large trade that is measured as being over 10,000 
shares. The sample period spans from August 2018 to August 2020. This sample contains 
observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days on the IEX during the sample period. 
 
Number of Trades in Block Sizes         
Trade Metric N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
% of Block Trades  505 5.50% 0.58% 4.63% 6.76% 0.828 
Block Trades Between 
10,000 - 19,999 Shares 505 5,762 2,308 3,873 14,911 2.857 
Block Trades Between 
20,000 - 49,999 Shares 505 1,652 852 1,094 5,223 3.279 
Block Trades Over 
50,000 Shares 505 252 127 142 697 2.099 
Table 11 - Block Trades on the IEX 
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Table VI – IEX Monthly Statistics 
The table below reports descriptive statistics for various exchange metrics for the 
IEX measured monthly. Each statistic has been measured monthly for the IEX. Average 
order size, average aggregate fill size, and the number of unique symbols traded are all 
intuitively named for the data they represent. First wave trade fill weight is the percentage 
of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the trade’s first 
routed signal. The first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of 
either the order size or the number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the 
smaller of the two denominator options. The sample period spans from August 2018 to 
August 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days 
on the IEX during the sample period. 
 
Monthly Trade Statistics on the IEX         
Exchange Metrics N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Average Order Size 505 454.84 102.65 266 674 0.329 
Average Aggregate 
Fill Size 505 175.65 14.02 140 201 -0.550 
Number of Unique 
Symbols Traded 505 8122.46 229.47 7818 8600 0.730 
First Wave Trade 
Fill Weight 505 7.69% 9.23% 0.03% 47.02% 1.534 
First Wave Fill 
Percentage 505 96.03% 5.18% 55.03% 99.53% -3.644 
Table 12 - Monthly Trading Statistics for the IEX 
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Table VII – Exchange Fill Weights and Fill Rates 
The tables below report descriptive statistics for the fill weights and fill rates of 
each exchange in the US. First wave trade fill weight is the percentage of routed trades in 
the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the trade’s first routed signal. The 
first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of either the order size 
or the number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the smaller of the two 
denominator options. Each statistic has been measured monthly for the sample period 
which spans from August 2018 to August 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 
7935) accounting for 505 trading days during the sample period. 
 
Panel A: Fill Weights for US Venues 
 
Fill Weight by Exchange         
Venue N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
IEX 7935 16.570% 1.961% 12.620% 20.920% -0.135 
NYSE American 7935 0.316% 0.080% 0.210% 0.510% 0.903 
NYSE 7935 16.507% 5.533% 9.230% 23.840% 0.080 
NASDAQ 7935 29.248% 8.208% 21.020% 47.020% 0.959 
NYSE Arca 7935 13.003% 3.328% 7.590% 16.830% -0.239 
EDGX 7935 6.866% 0.947% 4.940% 8.960% -0.242 
BATS (Z) 7935 10.133% 5.188% 4.950% 20.940% 0.832 
BATS (Y) 7935 2.631% 1.153% 0.590% 4.930% -0.174 
NYSE National 7935 0.900% 0.711% 0.230% 2.180% 0.720 
EDGA 7935 1.773% 0.555% 0.780% 2.920% 0.102 
NASDAQ BX 7935 1.105% 0.808% 0.170% 3.130% 0.698 
NASDAQ PSX 7935 0.767% 0.161% 0.480% 1.030% -0.403 
NYSE Chicago 7935 0.180% 0.196% 0.030% 0.840% 1.900 
Table 13 - Fill Weights for US Venues 
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Panel B: Fill Rates for US Venues 
 
Fill Rate by Exchange         
Venue N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
IEX 7935 98.638% 1.464% 91.980% 99.530% -4.086 
NYSE American 7935 97.994% 0.608% 95.780% 98.960% -1.684 
NYSE 7935 97.506% 1.199% 93.070% 98.640% -1.961 
NASDAQ 7935 98.583% 0.554% 96.750% 99.200% -1.654 
NYSE Arca 7935 97.999% 0.742% 95.200% 98.830% -2.041 
EDGX 7935 99.111% 0.247% 98.170% 99.350% -2.308 
BATS (Z) 7935 98.862% 0.207% 98.190% 99.110% -1.357 
BATS (Y) 7935 98.429% 0.292% 97.680% 99.030% -0.333 
NYSE National 7935 90.122% 3.283% 79.740% 94.210% -1.478 
EDGA 7935 97.015% 1.174% 93.830% 98.200% -1.306 
NASDAQ BX 7935 92.847% 1.297% 89.170% 94.590% -1.309 
NASDAQ PSX 7935 95.503% 1.128% 93.330% 97.340% -0.342 
NYSE Chicago 7935 85.804% 11.483% 55.030% 98.510% -0.741 





Table VIII – Comparison of HFT Presence on Exchanges by Volume37 
These tables report first difference test results between an exchange’s mean volume 
with odd-lots versus without odd-lots. Volume is measured as the single-counted sum of 
shares traded daily on an exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares 
or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots as a proxy 
for HFT. The difference is calculated by subtracting non-odd-lots values from odd-lots 
values. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018, to August 13th, 2020. This 
sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample selection 
includes two primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest 
venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one of 
these four exchanges. Significant levels are represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Panel A: HFT Presence on the IEX by Volume 
IEX Volume        
Classification 
HFT Proxy 




Tape A 123,741,927  118,601,154  5,140,773  4.15% 21.91*** 
Tape B 22,731,102  22,276,583  454,519  2.00% 16.4*** 
Tape C 64,700,435  61,541,148  3,159,287  4.88% 12.01*** 
Market 211,173,465  202,418,885  8,754,580  4.15% 20.65*** 
Table 15 - HFT Presence on the IEX  
 
37 This table is aggregated in Appendix # to facilitate comparison between exchanges 
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Panel B: HFT Presence on NYSE American by Volume 
 
NYSE American Volume       
Classification 
HFT Proxy 









 Tape A 7,728,425  6,918,151  810,274  10.48% 3.57*** 
Tape B 15,058,628  14,431,443  627,185  4.16% 2.44*** 
Tape C 3,977,312  3,548,604  428,708  10.78% 3.11*** 
Market 26,764,365  24,898,198  1,866,167  6.97% 5.5*** 
Table 16 - HFT Presence on NYSE American 
 
Panel C: HFT Presence on NYSE by Volume 
 
NYSE Volume       
Classification 
HFT Proxy 





Tape A 607,218,125  549,192,212  58,025,913  9.56% 7.48*** 
Tape B 55,651,452 46,666,551  8,984,901 19.25% 34.87*** 
Tape C 47,026,182 41,951,205  5,074,977 12.10% 47.74*** 
Market 695,835,881  651,869,847  43,966,034  6.32% 7.64*** 
Table 17 - HFT Presence on NYSE 
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Panel D: HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Volume 
 
NASDAQ Volume       
Classification 
HFT Proxy 
Difference Odd Lots / Volume T-Stat 







Tape A 500,844,645  434,678,771  66,165,874  13.21% 0.85 
Tape B 217,750,887  209,478,750  8,272,137  3.80% 7.23*** 
Tape C 559,627,488  486,288,375  73,339,112  13.10% 2.56*** 
Market 1,278,223,019  1,130,445,896  147,777,123  11.56% 0.12 
Table 18 - HFT Presence on NASDAQ 
  
 50 
Table IX – Comparison of HFT Presence on Exchanges by Market Share38 
These tables report first difference test results between an exchange’s mean market 
share with odd-lots versus without odd-lots. Market share for an exchange is measured as 
the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume in the market. Market 
share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares 
or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots as a proxy 
for HFT. The difference is calculated by subtracting non-odd-lots values from odd-lots 
values. A negative difference indicates an increase when accounting for odd-lots. The 
sample period spans from August 13th, 2018, to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains 
observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample selection includes two 
primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by 
market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one of these four 
exchanges. Significant levels are represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: HFT Presence on the IEX by Market Share 




With Odd Lots Without Odd Lots 
IE
X  
Tape A 3.325% 3.420% -0.0949% -4.67*** 
Tape B 1.435% 1.442% -0.0075% -5.62*** 
Tape C 2.664% 2.741% -0.0767% -12.64*** 
Market 2.728% 2.786% -0.0579% -4.59*** 
Table 19 - HFT Presence on the IEX by Market Share  
 
38 This table is aggregated in Appendix # to facilitate comparison between exchanges 
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Panel B: HFT Presence on NYSE American by Market Share 
 












 Tape A 0.199% 0.192% 0.0074% 8.67*** 
Tape B 0.955% 0.940% 0.0151% 4.32*** 
Tape C 0.152% 0.148% 0.0044% 17.02*** 
Market 0.330% 0.327% 0.0020% 5.45*** 
Table 20 - HFT Presence on NYSE American by Market Share 
 
Panel C: HFT Presence on NYSE by Market Share 
 








Tape A 16.271% 15.914% 0.3569% 37.38*** 
Tape B 2.947% 3.466% -0.5194% -66.12*** 
Tape C 1.684% 1.972% -0.2871% -71.69*** 
Market 8.921% 8.922% 0.0010% 16.07*** 
Table 21 - HFT Presence on NYSE by Market Share 
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Panel D: HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Market Share 
 










Tape A 13.259% 12.360% 0.8991% 7.96*** 
Tape B 13.484% 13.338% 0.1459% 4.06*** 
Tape C 21.960% 20.604% 1.3563% 1.61* 
Market 16.069% 15.149% 0.9200% 4.23*** 
Table 22 - HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Market Share 
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Table X – Regression by Exchange Volume 
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
exchange volume as the dependent variable. This dependent variable was used in two 
forms, one containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Volume is measured 
as the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on an exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades 
made in a size of 100 shares or less. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-
lots and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans 
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include the two primary access delay 
venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE & 
NASDAQ). Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the corresponding 
test statistic.Test statistics include significant levels which are represented by *, **, & *** 
for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table XI – Regression by Exchange Market Share 
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
exchange market share as the dependent variable. This dependent variable was used in two 
forms, one containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Market share for an 
exchange is measured as the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume 
in the market. Market share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made 
in a size of 100 shares or less. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots 
and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans 
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include the two primary access delay 
venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE & 
NASDAQ). Panel A uses only the four exchanges as test parameters. Panel B contains the 
same analysis but includes the first wave trade fill weight as the initial parameter. Panel C 
replicates the previous analysis again but adds an interaction variable between first wave 
trade fill weight and total market volume (with odd-lots). First wave trade fill weight is the 
percentage of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the 
trade’s first routed signal Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the 
corresponding test statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are represented 
by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐴: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒





𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 	= 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝐹 +	𝛽#𝑉 +	𝛽$𝐴 + 𝛽%𝑁 + 𝛽%𝑄 + 𝜖 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐶: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
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Table XII – Regression by IEX Monthly Statistics Volume 
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
adjusted exchange volume for the IEX as the dependent variable. Volume is measured as 
the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on the IEX and has been adjusted using the 
natural logarithm of the statistic. This dependent variable was used in two forms, one 
containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Odd-lots refers to trades made 
in a size of 100 shares or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting 
odd-lots as a proxy for HFT. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots 
and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans 
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include multiple different market 
statistics from the IEX. Panel A uses each metric along with the odd-lot trade percentage. 
Panel B contains the same analysis but removes odd-lot trade percentage because the 
dependent variable omits odd-lots. Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked 
above the corresponding test statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are 
represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐴:	 	ln(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑃 + 𝛽#𝑂 + 𝛽$𝑆 + 𝛽%𝐵 + 𝛽)𝐹 + 𝜖 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐵:	 	ln(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑂 +	𝛽#𝑆 + 𝛽$𝐵 + 𝛽%𝐹 + 𝜖 
  
 60 
Panel A: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots  
 
IEX Volume with Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats       
Model Specifications 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
β β β β β 
T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat 
Intercept/Constant  23.11*** 24.25*** -30.92*** -18.42*** -8.71*** 
  41.73 40.63 -5.18 -2.75 -1.38 
Odd-Lot Trade % (P) -5.4*** -5.25*** -2.5*** -1.68*** 1.33*** 
  -7.18 -7.10 -3.36 -2.20 1.70 
Order Size (O)   -0.21*** 0.31*** 0.11*** -0.32*** 
    -4.60 4.44 1.35 -3.54 
Unique Symbols Traded (S)     5.56*** 4.18*** 3*** 
     9.28 6.07 4.62 
% Traded in Block (B)       8.63*** 16.1*** 
      3.90 7.32 
First Wave Weight (F)         0.06*** 
       9.23 
            
Observations 504 504 504 504 504 
Trading Days 7920 7920 7920 7920 7920 
R-Squared  0.093 0.130 0.258 0.280 0.385 




Panel B: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics without Odd-Lots 
 
IEX Volume without Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats     
Model Specifications 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
β β β β 
T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat 
Intercept/Constant  20.39*** -41.07*** -22.05*** -6.51*** 
  70.49 -7.61 -3.35 -1.03 
Order Size (O) -0.21*** 0.39*** 0.13*** -0.3** 
  -4.5 5.72 1.47 -3.29 
Unique Symbols Traded (S)   6.42*** 4.42*** 2.86*** 
    11.40 6.43 4.34 
% Traded in Blocks (B)     10.52*** 15.23 
     4.86 7.38 
First Wave Weight (F)       0.05*** 
      9.28 
          
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Trading Days 7920 7920 7920 7920 
R-Squared  0.039 0.236 0.271 0.378 




Table XIII – Regression by IEX Monthly Statistics Market Share 
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses market 
share for the IEX as the dependent variable. Market share for an exchange is measured as 
the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume in the market. Market 
share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares 
or less. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots 
is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018 
to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading 
days. The test parameters include multiple different market statistics from the IEX. Panel 
A uses each metric along with the odd-lot trade percentage. Panel B contains the same 
analysis but removes odd-lot trade percentage because the dependent variable omits odd-
lots. Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the corresponding test 
statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are represented by *, **, & *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐴:	 	 *+,-./01	345671
84&.5	9.:;1&	345671
	= 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑃 + 𝛽#𝑂 + 𝛽$𝑆 + 𝛽%𝐵 + 𝛽)𝐹 + 𝜖 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙	𝐵:	 	 *+,-./01	345671
84&.5	9.:;1&	345671
	= 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑂 +	𝛽#𝑆 + 𝛽$𝐵 + 𝛽%𝐹 + 𝜖 
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Panel A: IEX Market Share Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots 
 
IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats     
Model Specifications 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
β β β β β 
T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat 
Intercept/Constant  0.06*** -0.01*** 0.7*** 0.44*** 0.64*** 
  6.12 -0.78 9.02 5.22 9.35 
Odd-Lot Trade % (P) -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.1*** -0.04*** 
  -3.20 -5.16 -8.75 -10.46 -4.77 
Order Size (O)   0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0*** 
    19.79 5.50 8.31 0.03 
Unique Symbols Traded (S)     -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.07*** 
     -9.14 -4.91 -9.45 
% Traded in Block (B)       -0.18*** -0.03*** 
      -6.29 -1.05 
First Wave Weight (F)         0*** 
       17.16 
            
Observations 504 504 504 504 504 
Trading Days 7920 7920 7920 7920 7920 
R-Squared  0.02 0.45 0.528 0.563 0.725 
Adj. R-Squared 0.018 0.448 0.526 0.56 0.723 
Table 27 - IEX Market Share Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots 
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Panel B: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics without Odd-Lots 
 
IEX Market Share without Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats   
Model Specifications 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
β β β β 
T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat 
Intercept/Constant  -0.04*** 0.35*** 0.18* 0.59*** 
  -10.8 4.45 1.90 8.16 
Order Size (O) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0 
  18.18 7.77 7.88 -1.27 
Unique Symbols Traded (S)   -0.04*** -0.02** -0.06*** 
    -4.99 -2.32 -8.51 
% Traded in Blocks (B)     -0.09*** 0.03 
     -2.8 1.40 
First Wave Weight (F)       0*** 
      21.1 
          
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Trading Days 7920 7920 7920 7920 
R-Squared  0.397 0.425 0.434 0.702 
Adj. R-Squared 0.395 0.423 0.431 0.7 












Table 1 Results 
All four of the sample exchanges used displayed higher volume when accounting 
for odd-lots trades than without odd-lots trades. The IEX had nearly ten times as much 
volume as NYSE American. Volume on the NYSE big board is triple that of the IEX and 
the volume on the NASDAQ Book is six times the amount of the IEX. The IEX volume 
was comprised mostly in Tape A stocks while the NYSE American volume occurred most 
in Tape B stocks. The NYSE big board displayed an increase in Tape B and Tape C volume 
when accounting for odd-lots and these were the only two cases where volume increased 
when removing odd-lots from the sample.  
Table 2 Results 
Of each sample exchange, the IEX was the only exchange that displayed a 
considerable increase in market share when removing odd lots. The NYSE big board also 
displayed an increase at a negligible 1/100th of a percent. The majority of market share for 
the IEX is in Tape A stocks similar to the results for IEX volume. Likewise for NYSE 
American, their market share was dominated by Tape B stocks. The NYSE big board and 
NASDAQ Book exchanges combine to account for roughly 30% of the market during this 
sample period39. 
 
39 This is roughly half of the typical amount of displayed market share based on recent years. 
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Table 3 Results 
The volume reported by IEX is slightly lower than was reported by CBOE Global 
Markets. This is due to the number of broker self-cross that occurs on their exchange. Of 
the 244.9 million shares traded on the IEX, 41.5 million were displayed order types and 34 
million were routed orders.  
Table 4 Results 
The majority of aggregate fills executed by the IEX were fills under 100 shares in 
size (73.634%). With the exception of trades between 100 and 199 shares, the average 
percentage of fills decreases as the size of trades increases. Every data point except for 
odd-lot-sized trades has a positive skewness indicating a potential for large positive outliers 
in the dataset. As trade size increases, the level of positive skewness of the data also 
increases. Under 1% of aggregates fills were made in block sizes or fills above 10,000 
shares in size (0.083%). 
Table 5 Results 
The IEX handled 5.50% of their volume in block sizes during the sample period. 
The majority of these trades were between 10,000 and 19,999 shares (5,762 trades). Only 
a small number of trades exceeded 50,000 shares (252 trades). All block trade statistics had 
a very high level of positive skewness indicating large positive outliers.  
Table 6 Results 
The IEX had a mean order size of 455 shares and a mean aggregate fill size of 175 
shares. These values are roughly in line with many dark pools including the 
IntelligentCross dark pool, which operates using an access delay40. The IEX trades an 
 
40 Dark pool FINRA quarterly reports available at https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/otc-
transparency/ats-quarterly-statistics 
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average of 8122 stocks out of roughly 11,500 publicly listed companies41 in the U.S. and 
this value has a considerable positive skewness (0.730). The first wave trade fill weight for 
the IEX is 7.69% and this value has a high positive skewness since this value has increased 
over the sample period. First wave fill percentage has a mean of 96.03% and this value has 
very high negative skewness indicating negative outliers in the dataset.  
Table 7 Results 
Of all exchanges in the U.S. market system during the sample period, the IEX 
(16.57%) ranked second behind the NASDAQ Book (29.248%) in their first wave fill 
weights. When measuring the rankings of first wave fill rates, the IEX (98.638%) landed 
in third place behind EDGX (99.111%) and BATS (98.862%). All fill rates had negative 
skewness, likely due to time of volatility in the market. Smaller exchanges had large 
positive skewness in their first wave fill weights.  
Difference Tests Results  
Table 8 Results 
This table contains the results from a difference in means test between volumes for 
each one of the four sample exchanges. Each exchange showed a statistically significant 
difference in Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and Total volume at the 1% level except for the 
NASDAQ Book which did not show a statistically significant difference in Tape A volume 
or Total volume. Of all the exchanges, the IEX had the lowest percent of odd-lots per share 
of volume in Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and Total volume.  
Table 9 Results 
 
41 Value taken from this article: https://www.benzinga.com/news/20/10/18026067/the-number-of-
companies-publicly-traded-in-the-us-is-shrinking-or-is-it 
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This table contains the results from a difference in means test between market share 
for each one of the four sample exchanges. Market share is already a relative value because 
it quantifies volume relative to total volume in the market so an extra calculation was not 
required. The IEX showed a considerable increase in total market share (0.0579%) when 
odd-lots were removed from the dataset. Both the NYSE big board (0.001%) and NYSE 
American (-0.002) showed negligible change in total market share when odd-lots were 
removed. The NASDAQ Book had the largest change (-0.920%) with nearly a 1% decrease 
in total market share when removing odd-lots from the data.  
Regression Results 
Table 10 Results 
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
exchange volume as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the IEX alternates between 
negative and positive and is only significant in Model B for odd-lots and non-odd-lots 
regressions. NYSE American had negative and significant coefficients across the board. 
Conversely, the NYSE big board and the NASDAQ Book both had positive, significant 
coefficients both including and omitting odd-lots from the dependent variable. The 
explanatory power of the model increases with more independent variables as shown by 
the increase in r-squared values.  
Table 11 Results 
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses 
market share as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the IEX is negative and 
significant in every model. The coefficient for NYSE American is also negative and 
significant across the board. Each model in each panel displays an increase in explanatory 
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power from the previous as indicated by the increases in r-squared. Conversely to the IEX 
and NYSE American, the NYSE big board and NASDAQ Book exchanges both have 
positive, significant coefficients in every model.  
Panel A shows a comparable analysis to Table 10 because it only differs in that the 
dependent variable is market share as opposed to volume. Panel B include First Wave 
Weight because this variable is a proxy for the amount of liquidity that an exchange can 
capture (Bishop, 2017). First Wave Weight is significant and positive for both Panel’s B 
and C. Panel C adds an interaction variable to the analysis. The interaction variable 
combines First Wave Weight with Total Volume to create a new explanatory variable. This 
interaction variable describes the effect based on the combined changes in First Wave 
Weight and Total Volume. In Panel C, the interaction variable is negative and significant. 
It shows that market share decreases in cases where First Wave Weight and Total Volume 
without odd-lots both increases.  
Table 12 Results 
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses IEX 
volume as the in dependent variable. In Panel A, the dependent variable contains odd-lots 
and all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Panel B uses the dependent variable 
without odd-lots.  Independent variables in this analysis are market statistics about the IEX 
that act as a proxy for a market trend. Odd-lot trade percentage is a proxy for HFT, order 
size is useful for exchange comparisons, unique symbols traded is a proxy for market 
involvement, block trade percentage is a proxy for investor time and dark pool competition, 
and first wave weight is a proxy for liquidity. 
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Panel A shows that the odd-lot percentage has a negative coefficient across each 
model, except for in the final model that adds first wave weight. Order size flips between 
negative and positive coefficients. Unique symbols traded and block trade percentage both 
have positive coefficients across the board.  
Panel B did not contain odd-lot trade percentage because the dependent variable 
omits odd-lots. Order size was significant, but the last model was at the 5% level and not 
the 1% level. Order size had negative and positive coefficients and carried the same signs 
as in the prior panel. Unique symbols traded were all significant and positive across the 
board. Block trade percentage were positive, but only significant in Model C. Finally, first 
wave weight was positive and significant. 
Table 13 Results 
Table 14 replicates Table 13 using a new independent variable: market share 
instead of volume. Each independent metric can be thought of in the same way as described 
above. In Panel A, market share contains odd-lots and in Panel B odd-lots were omitted 
from the dependent variable.  
Panel A shows that the odd-lot percentage has negative coefficients across the 
board and are all significant. The coefficient for order size differed from Table 13 in that 
it was positive across the entire board. Order size coefficients were all statistically 
significant. Unique symbols traded showed opposite results from the analysis in Table 13 
using volume because all coefficients were negative. Similarly, block trade percentage was 
negative across the board. Finally, first wave weight was not a large enough coefficient to 
interpret. Unique symbols traded, block trade percentage, and first wave weight were all 
significant.   
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Auxiliary Hypotheses Data Analysis and Results 
The empirical analysis and dataset discussed so far was unable to address some of 
the auxiliary hypotheses that compared the emergence of IEX and NYSE American with 
the BATS exchange. For reference, the following 3 sub-hypotheses look to test a time-
series analysis of the IEX and NYSE American: 
Hypothesis 3b – Market share and volume has increased over time on IEX and NYSE 
American 
Hypothesis 3c – The market share of the IEX increased faster in its first year than the 
market share of BATS did in its first year 
Hypothesis 3d – The market share and volume of the NYSE American increased faster in 
its first two years than the market share of BATS did in its first two years 
Answering these hypotheses was simplest to do using an ordinary least squares 
regression via a line of best fine on a scatterplot of the data. The following data was 
collected and prepared separately from the primary dataset. Data was collected from the 
CBOE by downloading a pre-formatted CSV file of all volume for every exchange from 
the 2007-2020. After downloading this file, the data could be simply moved into SPSS for 
analysis.  
Preparing the data was slightly more challenging. First, the dates for the first day 
of recorded traded needed to be identified manually in the data set. After discovering the 
first day of trading for each exchange listed in the hypotheses the end date for each sample 
was set 2 years following that date. Each sample date range then needed to be indexed into 
numerical values so that the data could be divided and analyzed individually.  
 72 
Analyzing the data was a simple process. Once the data had been prepared, it was 
transferred into SPSS. Through SPSS the data was plotted into a scatterplot for a single 
exchange. Once the scatterplot was built, a line of best fit was calculated and added along 
with the regression equation. A final note is that the BATS exchange emerged during the 
2007-2008 recession which undoubtedly hurts the analysis overall. Due to this exogenous 
event, the analysis was replicated for the first two years of trading beginning with the 
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 This research draws information from existing research and an empirical analysis 
to show that the IEX fills a unique niche in the market system and has generally achieved 
its goal of deterring HFT behavior. Based on the theory from O’Hara & Ye (2011) that 
the market functions as one cohesive exchange with multiple points of entry, the IEX has 
become yet another entry point. The IEX as an entry point to the market services many 
investor types, but ultimately has grown to serve the function that a dark pool is intended 
to create: protection for large orders for broker-dealers. Additionally, my findings show 
that the IEX is effective in deterring HFT behavior so odd-lots volatility on the IEX is 
less of a concern for retail investors.  
 The fact that access delay exchanges are permitted to interact with the NBBO in 
a different way is naturally unfair, but does it create a significant advantage for the IEX? 
The fact is that the IEX is truly a market response to the HFT problem. Every exchange 
has access to the same rules that permit the IEX to function with an access delay. The 
NYSE has implemented an access delay on NYSE American and found less success than 
the IEX during a similar time period. Ultimately, the growth and success of the IEX can 
certainly be somewhat attributed to their innovations and their initiative with the SEC to 
admit their business model to the industry.  
 The IEX grown year over year in its market share and has been more successful in 
its operation than its competitor, the NYSE American. The IEX has a significant portion 
of aggregate fills in the odd-lots size, but has minimal slippage as trade size increases. 
This could explain why IEX market share increases when accounting for HFT behavior 
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on their exchange. Their ability to fill block-size routed orders speaks to their liquidity 
provision as an exchange also. However, only 5.5% of their total volume is made in block 
sizes. The exchange trades in 70-80% of the market in terms of symbols traded each year 
so their market penetration could certainly improve in the years to come.  
 The IEX has found substantial success in the exchange design when analyzing 
from the view of routed trades. The IEX ranks near the top of all exchanges in terms of 
its first wave fill rate and first wave fill weight. These values indicate that the IEX 
captures a high level of liquidity in the market despite having lower market share.  
 My findings show that the IEX is effective in deterring HFT behavior on their 
exchange. In my first-difference analysis of the four sample exchanges, the IEX had the 
lowest percent of odd-lots per share of volume in every category of stocks. Additionally, 
their market share increased when accounting for odd-lots. This is even more substantial 
given that roughly 73% of trades were made in odd-lots sizes on the IEX during the 
sample period. Of each sample exchange, the IEX was the only exchange to show a 
considerable increase in market share when accounting for odd-lots. This also supports 
the conclusion that the IEX has become a niche for large trades to occur at a more 
favorable price.  
 Volume on the IEX does not have considerable predictive power over volume in 
the market. Compared to NYSE big board and the NASDAQ Book which both 
significantly predict total volume. This confirms that using the NYSE big board and 
NASDAQ book was a proper choice for comparing the IEX to the market. Market share 
for the IEX on the other hand decreases relative to total volume in the sample period. 
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This indicates that the IEX is less capable of handling moments of high volatility and that 
volume moves off their exchange to larger venues at those times.  
 In every model, the first wave weight for exchanges has a positive relationship 
with market share. This supports the claim that the IEX can capture liquidity better than 
other exchanges despite low market share. When using interaction terms to analyze the 
first wave weight with total volume, I discovered that first wave weight decreases when 
volume increases. This indicates that less orders are routed during times of high volume. 
The high value of first wave weight that the IEX has shows that it has created an effective 
model using its access delay because it can capture a high amount of routed shares even if 
volume is changing in the market.  
 The final model used in this analysis is highly insightful to the IEX. It reinforces 
the deterrence of HFT as discovered in the difference tests because of the negative 
coefficient for odd-lots. Volume increases on the IEX lead to more market penetration 
and block share trade percentages. The first wave weight for the IEX has a positive 
relationship with both volume and market share despite evidence that the IEX struggles 
during times of volatility.  
 When using market share in the final model the results are mostly the same but 
differ slightly. Odd-lot trade percentage has a negative relationship with market share 
indicating again that the IEX deters HFT behavior. Order sizes on the IEX generally 
increase with market share. This also supports the theory that the IEX has become a good 
place for large trades to occur without slippage. Market share decreases, however, 
relative to the number of symbols traded on the exchange. This indicates that core 
investors who trade on the IEX may have a smaller risk appetite, or that the IEX has not 
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been able to fully penetrate the available market. Block trades also have a negative 
relationship with market share in this model. This counters the claim that the IEX is a 
safe place for large trades to occur, but should be taken in context with the rest of the 
analysis. 
Overall, the IEX has been a topic of high emotion for the equity market. From the 
passionate story told in Flash Boys to the intense debate between Brad Katsuyama and 
William O’Brien, stakeholders in the market have become divided as fragmentation 
continues for venues. Based on the available research and the analysis here, 
fragmentation has generally good effects on the market. The IEX is another point of an 
entry for the cohesive market system. Although the IEX has been seen as a proponent 
against HFT, it is important to remember that AT differs from HFT. The market system 
relies on AT to connect what has become such a fragmented system. Future analysis of 
the IEX would benefit more targeted, event-based datasets to explore how the IEX 
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“Pre-1995 — ‘Before the digital revolution, a handful of exchanges, including NYSE, 
AMEX, NASDAQ, CBOE and the CME dominated the industry. Markets were highly 
controlled, with nearly all orders executed on an exchange floor.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
 
“1996 — ‘The SEC adopts Order Handling Rules, bringing the nascent electronic trading 
markets into the national market system and making them accessible to the public.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
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“2000 — ‘The maker-taker pricing model becomes the standard pricing model in US 
equities markets.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
 
“2003 — ‘Exchange interest in new pricing and billing models soars, with exchanges 
creating more complex and frequently changing fee schedules.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
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“2005 — ‘The SEC adopts Regulation NMS in August, requiring brokers to verify that 
they have made an effort to execute their client's trade at the best possible price.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
 
“2015 — ‘Markets have diversified to include 13 equities exchanges, 12 options exchanges 
and 40 dark pools.’” 
 
Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider 
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“1851 - Paul Julius Reuter begins sending stock market quotations between London and 
Paris via a cable beneath the English Channel, having previously deployed pigeons to carry 
stock prices in Europe. 
1990s - The rise of electronic marketplaces such as Archipelago, acquired by the New York 
Stock Exchange, Island ECN, now a part of Nasdaq, and Globex at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange enable algorithms to read market data and automatically execute trades. 
2000 - Decimalization of US stock prices allows investors to buy and sell in penny 
increments, cutting the price spreads that underpinned profit margins for market-makers and 
encouraging traders to increase volumes to make up the difference. 
Mid-2000s - Exchanges let traders pay to co-locate computers inside data centers, enabling 
them to receive and act on market data faster than those outside. 
2005 - Regulation National Market System in the US increases competition among stock 
trading venues and turbocharges a race for the fastest technology between exchanges. 
2010 - Spread Networks opens a fibre-optic link between New York and Chicago, reducing 
round-trip latency to 13.3 milliseconds, or thousandths of a second. Speeds are soon 
eclipsed by microwave networks that convey market data in about 8 milliseconds. 
2012 - An electronic trading glitch causes Knight Capital to mistakenly purchase billions of 
dollars of shares in 148 NYSE stocks, causing more than $400m in losses and precipitating 
its takeover by Getco, a rival HFT company. The merged company, KCG Holdings, was later 
acquired by Virtu Financial. 
2018 - Go West to go live between Chicago and Tokyo, speeding the flow of futures-market 
data over wireless towers, fiber-optic lines and submarine cables. It is a joint venture of big 
trading firms such as DRW, IMC and Jump Trading.”42 
  
 








The code below was written in Python and used to combine the CSV files 







import os, glob 
import pandas as pd 
 
path = '/Users/cam/PyCharmProjects/HistoricalCBOEDataAppend' 
 
all_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(path, "market_history_*.csv")) 
df_from_each_file = (pd.read_csv(f, sep=',') for f in all_files) 
df_merged = pd.concat(df_from_each_file, ignore_index=True) 
df_merged.to_csv("merged.csv") 
 
import os, glob 
import pandas as pd 
 
path = '/Users/cam/PyCharmProjects/CBOEwithoddlots/Odd Lots 
Volume CSV Files' 
 
all_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(path, "mktshare_v_exc_*.csv")) 
df_from_each_file = (pd.read_csv(f, sep=',') for f in all_files) 
df_merged = pd.concat(df_from_each_file, ignore_index=True) 
df_merged.to_csv("Odd Lots Volume.csv") 
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The code below was written in python and used to manipulate the CSV files 
download from CBOE Global Markets. It was used to separate Tape A from Tape B from 
Tape C. This program is described in greater detail in the Methodology chapter. 
  
import pandas as pd 
 
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots Volume With TRFs.csv') 
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NASDAQ TRF 
Carteret')].index 
df.drop(trf, inplace = True) 
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret.csv') 
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret.csv') 
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NYSE TRF')].index 
df.drop(trf, inplace = True) 
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret or NYSE.csv') 
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret or NYSE.csv') 
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NASDAQ TRF 
Chicago')].index 
df.drop(trf, inplace = True) 
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No TRFs.csv') 
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The code below was written in python and used to organize the data after it was 
combined and manipulated using the first two programs. This program is described in 





import pandas as pd 
 
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No TRFs.csv') 
 
totalmv = df.groupby('Date')['% of Mkt'].sum().reset_index() 
totalmv_tapea = df.groupby('Date')['Tape A'].sum().reset_index() 
totalmv_tapeb = df.groupby('Date')['Tape B'].sum().reset_index() 
totalmv_tapec = df.groupby('Date')['Tape C'].sum().reset_index() 
totalms = df.groupby('Date')['Market'].sum().reset_index() 
totalms_tapea = df.groupby('Date')['Tape A Market 
Share'].sum().reset_index() 
totalms_tapeb = df.groupby('Date')['Tape B Market 
Share'].sum().reset_index() 
totalms_tapec = df.groupby('Date')['Tape C Market 
Share'].sum().reset_index() 
 
dftotals = pd.DataFrame([totalmv['% of Mkt'], 
                        totalmv_tapea['Tape A'], 
                        totalmv_tapeb['Tape B'], 
                        totalmv_tapec['Tape C'], 
                        totalms['Market'], 
                        totalms_tapea['Tape A Market Share'], 
                        totalms_tapeb['Tape B Market Share'], 
                        totalms_tapec['Tape C Market Share']]) 
dftotals = dftotals.transpose() 
print(dftotals) 
 
dftotals.to_csv('Odd Lots No Trfs Totals.csv') 
 
 94 












MI Add non-displayed 
liquidity $0.0009 0.30% of TDV 
ML Add displayed liquidity FREE 0.30% of TDV 
TI Remove non-displayed 
liquidity $0.0009 0.30% of TDV 
TL Remove displayed liquidity $0.0006 0.30% of TDV 
X Opening Process for Non-
Listed Securities (“Opening 
Process”) 
$0.0009 0.30% of TDV 
O, C, H, P Auction Match Fee $0.0003 0.30% of TDV 
Alpha Routing and removing 
liquidity (all routing 
options) 
Cost + $0.0001 
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Fee Codes Description Fee 
MI Adds non-displayed liquidity $0.0009 
ML Adds displayed liquidity FREE 
TI Removes non-displayed liquidity $0.0009 
TL Removes displayed liquidity $0.0006 
MIS Member adds resting non-displayed liquidity that executes 
against the Member’s removing interest FREE 
MLS Member adds resting displayed liquidity that executes against 
the Member’s removing interest FREE 
TIS Member removes resting non-displayed liquidity added by 
such Member FREE 
TLS Member removes resting displayed liquidity added by such 
Member $0.0006 
TIR1 Retail order removes non-displayed liquidity FREE 
MIA Retail Liquidity Provider order adds non-displayed liquidity 
that executes against a Retail order FREE 
TLR1 Retail order removes displayed liquidity FREE 
TISR1 Retail order removes non-displayed liquidity added by such 
Member FREE 
MISA Retail Liquidity Provider order adds non-displayed liquidity to 
a Retail order added by such Member FREE 
TLSR1 Retail order removes displayed liquidity added by such 
Member FREE 
X Opening Process for Non-Listed Securities ("Opening Process") $0.0009 
XD Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in 
the Opening Process FREE 
O Opening Auction, IEX-listed security $0.0003 
OD Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in 
the Opening Auction FREE 
C Closing Auction, IEX-listed security $0.0003 
CD Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in 
the Closing Auction FREE 
H Halt or Volatility Auction, IEX-listed security $0.0003 
P IPO Auction, IEX-listed security $0.0003 
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Tape A 123,741,927  118,601,154  5,140,773  4.15% 21.91*** 
Tape B 22,731,102  22,276,583  454,519  2.00% 16.4*** 
Tape C 64,700,435  61,541,148  3,159,287  4.88% 12.01*** 










Tape A 7,728,425  6,918,151  810,274  10.48% 3.57*** 
Tape B 15,058,628  14,431,443  627,185  4.16% 2.44*** 
Tape C 3,977,312  3,548,604  428,708  10.78% 3.11*** 





Tape A 607,218,125  549,192,212  58,025,913  9.56% 7.48*** 
Tape B 46,666,551  55,651,452  (8,984,901) -19.25% 34.87*** 
Tape C 41,951,205  47,026,182  (5,074,977) -12.10% 47.74*** 






 Tape A 500,844,645  434,678,771  66,165,874  13.21% 0.85 
Tape B 217,750,887  209,478,750  8,272,137  3.80% -7.23*** 
Tape C 559,627,488  486,288,375  73,339,112  13.10% 2.56*** 








With Odd Lots Without Odd Lots 
IE
X 
Tape A 3.325% 3.420% 0.0949% 4.67*** 
Tape B 1.435% 1.442% 0.0075% -5.62*** 
Tape C 2.664% 2.741% 0.0767% 12.64*** 








 Tape A 0.199% 0.192% -0.0074% 8.67*** 
Tape B 0.955% 0.940% -0.0151% 4.32*** 
Tape C 0.152% 0.148% -0.0044% 17.02*** 




Tape A 16.271% 15.914% -0.3569% 37.38*** 
Tape B 2.947% 3.466% 0.5194% 66.12*** 
Tape C 1.684% 1.972% 0.2871% 71.69*** 





 Tape A 13.259% 12.360% -0.8991% 7.96*** 
Tape B 13.484% 13.338% -0.1459% 4.06*** 
Tape C 21.960% 20.604% -1.3563% 1.61* 
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